Recent studies have expanded the commercial bank certification hypothesis to include banks acting in an underwriting capacity. This paper further develops that research by focusing on the industrial revenue bond market in which banks have the unique opportunity to simultaneously act as both credit guarantor and underwriter. When explicitly allowing for bankissued standby letters of credit (guarantees), we find significantly greater yield spreads for those bonds underwritten by commercial banks compared to bonds underwritten by investment banks.
Introduction
Regulatory constraints on investment banking activities have severely limited the opportunity for studying the role of commercial banks as security underwriters in the United
States. Nevertheless, general findings to date suggest that smaller-sized firms that issue lower quality debt benefit most by having an underwriting relationship with a commercial bank.
Specifically, Puri (1996) finds that commercial bank underwritings of corporate bonds, in the pre-Glass-Steagall Act period, resulted in better pricing for smaller and lower credit rated issuers than similar issues underwritten by investment banking firms. Gande, Puri, Saunders and Walter (1997) draw similar conclusions for bond offerings in the 1985-1996 period when banks were allowed to use their Section 20 securities subsidiaries to engage in corporate bond underwritings.
However, Roten and Mullineaux (2002) find little difference in the yield spread between commercial bank and investment bank underwritten bonds in the later 1995-1998 period. Such conflicting findings may suggest that both underwriters may have unique areas of expertise in bond issuance. Our study expands on the above research by examining the potential certification benefits, in terms of issuance costs, that (may) occur when commercial banks simultaneously act as both credit guarantor and underwriter in municipal bond financing transactions.
Commercial banks are unique participants in the industrial revenue bond primary market as they frequently issue standby letters of credit, as a means of credit enhancement (or guarantee), and underwrite the actual bond offering itself. Consequently, the issuance of a standby letter of credit backing by a commercial bank might be viewed as a positive signal regarding the quality of the borrower since the bank's issuance of the guarantee can be considered as certification of the borrower's credit quality. Similar certification effects have been found with new loans and loan renewals (i.e. see James, 1987, for example) . Indeed, the municipal revenue bond market is well recognized for its high degree of information asymmetry among issuers and investors.
1 As a result, such certification services may be viewed as highly valuable. In addition, commercial banks concerned about reputation may also bring certification benefits to the issuer through the underwriting process (see Puri, 1996 , for example).
To examine the benefits of "double" certification, that is to examine the benefit to the issuer from using commercial banks as both standby letter of credit guarantors and underwriters, a sample of industrial revenue bond issues offered during the 1987-1998 period were segmented into a sub-samples containing those bonds with (without) standby letter of credit backing and underwritten by investment banks, and bonds with (without) standby letter of credit backing and underwritten by commercial banks. Using these sample partitions, as well as identifying separate sub-samples where the same bank offered both services (as opposed to different banks offering the two services separately), the empirical tests focus on the market's response to the type of underwriting undertaken. The market's response is measured by the size of the tax adjusted reoffering yields achieved by the issuer relative to matched maturity U.S. Treasury securities.
Since a standby letter of credit-backed bond is essentially a transaction-based loan in which a bank's guarantee provision cannot be inferred as indicative of a long-term banking relationship, and thus a long term monitoring role, any certification benefit may be small. Indeed, if the market only reacts favorably to the credit provision (contingent or otherwise) via a long-term lending relationship (and the monitoring role that this implies), there may be little 1 See Robbins, Apostolou and Strawser (1985) , and Ingram, Raman and Wilson (1989) . 2 See Berger and Udell (1995) .
significant difference between yields on bonds backed by standby letters of credit and those without such credit enhancement. Of course, the market may still view the guarantee favorably, irrespective of the degree of monitoring of the guarantee provider (the bank), as long as the credit quality of the guarantee provider is superior to that of the bond issuer. In this case, a positive spread saving should be observed between those issues utilizing guarantees and those not utilizing guarantees. In other words, the pure "insurance role" of guarantees would dominate the absence of significant benefits from (any) long term bank monitoring.
In addition to the certification effect inherent in the decision to employ a standby letter of credit, the municipal issuer must also choose among alternative underwriting options. In particular, a municipality's choice-set of underwriter includes both traditional investment banking firms and commercial banks. Controlling for the guarantee effects of letters of credit, we examine the relative degree to which the reputation of the commercial bank and investment banker adds to the value of an issue via reoffering yield spreads. Indeed, in bringing an issue to market, the underwriter (whether an investment bank or commercial bank) will carry out information collection activities.
In part, the reputation of the underwriter reflects the quality of this information monitoring and collection function over time.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 briefly describes the industrial revenue bond market. Section 3 presents data and the basic empirical model. Section 4 discusses the empirical results. Finally, Section 5 provides a summary and conclusions.
Industrial Revenue Bond Market
Industrial revenue bonds provide a means of tax exempt financing that has been used by a variety of corporations to fund the construction or acquisition of projects. Some form of governmental unit, ranging from a city to an issuing authority, provides the conduit through which the municipality issues the bonds on behalf of the corporation. In turn, the corporation pledges to pay the interest and principal on the bond usually in the form of a lease or loan agreement between the corporation and the issuing organization. In lease arrangements, rental payments are used to make the required debt interest and principal payments. The lease/purchase format allows the corporation to take advantage of applicable depreciation guidelines (and tax credits)
as well as being able to deduct interest payments as a business expense. When bonds are paid off, a corporation may assume title to the project itself for a nominal fee. The underlying legal agreement with the municipality is typically at the corporate level, as opposed to the project (bond) level, which places bondholders in an unsecured position against the revenues of the corporation. Additional security in the form of mortgage liens on the underlying project property or relet provisions under a lease agreement often enhances the bond's structure.
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This form of tax exempt debt exhibits certain features. The interest rate may range from a seven-day variable rate to a long-term fixed rate for 15-20 year maturities. Corporate backed issues typically trade at higher taxable equivalent yields than similar unsecured taxable debt of the same corporation. Principal repayment terms are often flexible and are structured to fit the unique cash flows of the company. The bonds are usually not callable for a minimum of three years.
Particularly, when the industrial revenue bonds are publicly traded, a commercial bank may provide credit enhancement via a standby letter of credit. The standby letter of credit provides additional security to the bond investor. The bank substitutes its credit worthiness for 3 This study does not explicitly allow for such internal credit enhancements for two reasons. First, such information is not generally available from the sources employed. Second, the specific value of such credit enhancements is difficult to measure because their respective values depend on the economic value of the asset, the transferability of the asset's use and the location of the asset.
that of its client (the issuer) to increase the attractiveness of the offering. The bank issuing the standby letter of credit is committed to paying the interest and principal on the bonds if the issuer fails to do so. With the employment of the standby letter, the issuer agrees, under a reimbursement agreement, to repay the bank for any draw-downs under the standby letter of credit agreement. Thus, the issuer expects to lower the interest cost on its borrowings. The bank may also designate whether additional collateral is required as security. Typically, the commercial bank issuing the standby letter must be rated investment grade or better. Moreover, the bank providing the standby letter of credit is often not the underwriter, i.e., the bond may be underwritten by another bank (investment or commercial). The final sample consisted of 1003 issues. Sub-samples include 665 issues which had no standby letter of credit backing and were underwritten by a traditional investment banker, 146 in which a commercial bank had issued the standby letter of credit but a traditional investment banker underwrote the offering, 82 issues in which commercial banks issued the standby letter of credit but also underwrote the issue and finally 110 issues in which there was no line of credit but a commercial bank underwrote the offering. Of the 82 issues in which commercial banks provided both services, a total of thirty-six issues employed the same commercial bank in both functions. Finally, there was no discernable trend over the period of our study in the frequency of commercial bank versus investment bank underwritings or in the proportion of sample bond offerings with standby letter of credit backing.
B. Empirical Tests and Model Parameters
Our primary test is to examine whether offering spreads differentiate between those issues underwritten by commercial banks and those by investment banks. This is examined both with and without the standby letter of credit variable in the model. Subsequent tests examine whether a commercial bank and investment banker's reputation has a significant impact on the determination of offering spreads. Finally, employing the sample in which the same bank provided both the standby letter of credit and underwriting services, we explicitly test the tradeoff between joint certification benefits and any possible conflict of interest effects when the same bank provides both services for the issuer. 6 In this case, considering the findings of Billett, Flannery and Garfinkel (1995) , we also analyze whether our results may be affected by the quality of the participating bank.
The dependent variable, PREMIUM, is the tax adjusted yield on the municipal bond minus the tax adjusted yield to maturity for a comparable maturity U.S. government bond issued in the same month. The Appendix explains how tax adjustments are made to both securities to present them on a comparable "yield" basis. Determinants of the yield spread are assumed to be those variables specified on the right hand side of equation (1) and described below: The first variable, RATING, is the Moody's bond rating measured according to the scale employed by Barclay and Smith (1995) and Billett, Flannery, and Garfinkel (1995) . 7 This variable is orthogonalized by employing the residual from the regression of RATING on the LETTER and TRATE variables. This process of quantifying the bond rating role is consistent with that described by Livingston and Miller (2000) in their analysis of industrial debt issues.
Controlling for LETTER allows us to measure the independent credit assessment effect of the rating agencies while controlling for TRATE reflects the findings of Duffee (1998) and Longstaff and Schwartz (1995) that the yield spreads on corporate bonds, over comparable maturity Treasury securities, fall when the Treasury bill rates rise. 8 The LETTER variable is 7 These values are 20(AAA), 19(AA1), 18 (AA2), 17(AA3), 16(A1), 15(A2), 14(A3), 13(BBB1), 12(BBB2), 11(BBB3), 10(BB1), and 9(BB2). None of the ratings were below BB. 8 Longstaff and Schwartz (1995) conclude that such a relationship can be attributed to the also orthogonalized by using the residual from the regression of LETTER on the issue size, maturity and previous issue variables to recognize the impact that the latter variables may have on the decision of the firm to utilize a standby letter of credit. (Insert Table 2) The PREMIUM model employs the size of the offering, SIZE, as a measure of marketability and potential scale economies in the underwriting process. The coefficient for MATURITY, the natural log of bond years to maturity, is expected to be positive due to the typically positive yield curve for municipal bond yields. Puri (1996) Following the approach of Carter, Dark, and Singh (1997) , the reputation measure is averaged over the measurement period. Similar information is not readily available to gauge the reputation of commercial banks as municipal bond underwriting firms. We use, as a proxy measure of reputation, the cumulative number of months that the bank's parent holding company operated a Section 20 subsidiary with the power to underwrite municipal revenue securities.
This variable is formed by the interaction between the dichotomous variable equal to one if the holding company has a Section 20 subsidiary and zero if not times the number of months between the date it was established and the month of the revenue bond offering. were more inclined to use a standby letter of credit as well as employ a commercial bank as the underwriting firm. Finally, both commercial banks as underwriters and investment banks were more likely to use a standby letter of credit for those issues in which the lessee was unlisted and there had been no previous issues (i.e., those issues in which the greatest information asymmetry existed between issuers and underwriters).
Empirical Results
(Insert Table 3) For the 82 issues in which commercial banks both issued the standby letter of credit and underwrote the issue, there exists the potential conflict of interests highlighted in previous research on commercial bank debt underwriting. The yield premium difference between those bonds in which the complete transaction is handled by the same bank and those using different banks is 11.7 basis points less for same bank issues. This difference is significant at the 5% level. Means comparisons of these sub-samples for the SIZE, MATURITY, RATING and PREVIOUS variables produce a significant difference only in MATURITY in which same bank issues evidenced longer maturities. These results provide preliminary evidence that refutes the conflict of interest hypothesis.
These univariate comparisons raise important questions regarding the net benefit of merely employing commercial banks as both credit guarantors and underwriters. Indeed, those issuers utilizing commercial banks in both functions appear to have the highest average yield spreads. However, such a conclusion is suspect given the differences in the subsamples as shown in Table 3 . Those issues which employed commercial banks in both functions were also the smallest ($3.27 million) and had the shortest average maturity (127.51 months). The shorter maturity suggest a lower yield as municipal bonds typically exhibit an upward sloping yield curve. Further, this subsample of issues was most susceptible to asymmetric information effects in that none involved exchange-listed lessees and only five were similar to previous issues.
Therefore, controlling for these effects using the multivariate approach, as shown in Equation 1, is essential for drawing firm conclusions regarding the benefits or costs of relying exclusively on a commercial bank for both functions. Table 4 presents OLS regression results for the yield premium model employed in Equation (1). The positive coefficient for maturity reflects a rising yield spread with maturity for municipal bonds. Similar to Gande, et al. (1997) and Puri (1996) , the regression results show that the orthogonalized credit rating variable has a significant impact on yield premia -the higher the rating the lower the yield spread. The sign for the Treasury security rate is also negative and significant as might be expected given previous studies showing the credit yield spread to be negatively related to the level of rates. Interestingly, a month of high supply (SUPPLY) of municipal offerings doesn't lead to a crowding out effect in that yield spreads are marginally lower in high issue months. Finally, the LIST and PREVIOUS variables have statistically insignificant effects in the regressions in Table 4. 9 (Insert Table 4) With respect to the effect of commercial bank underwriting and overall certification, the variable BANK1 is unity if a commercial bank provides a standby letter of credit but the bond is underwritten by an investment bank, and zero if not. BANK2 is unity if a commercial bank provides both a standby letter of credit and underwrites the issue. The coefficient for BANK1 is significantly negative and implies a 5.77 basis point reduction in spreads compared to those offerings in which there was no standby letter of credit backing of issues underwritten by investment banks. Moreover, the significantly positive coefficient for BANK2 implies a net increase in yield spreads of 3.83 basis points when the issuer elects to employ a commercial bank as the underwriter of bonds and commercial banks are providers of standby letter of credit backing. These results suggest that the certification effect, emanating from an investment bank as underwriter, strongly dominates the certification effect from commercial bank underwritings, even in the presence of standby letters of credit issued by commercial banks.
10 Table 5 splits the total sample according to bond maturity and issue size. Previous studies (i.e. see Gande et. al., 1999, for example) have shown that commercial banking relationships are particularly important for smaller firms. The samples were split according to the median issue size and maturity, respectively. In Table 5 , while the negative coefficient of 9 Table 4 regressions were also computed using the dichotomous variable SP100 (one if lessor is in the Standard and Poors 100 Index, zero if not) as an alternative reputation measure. Similar to LIST, the coefficient is negative but insignificant. 10 The YEAR variable was also included in which YEAR references the year in which each bond was issued. The negative coefficient is significant at the 5% level, showing that the yield premium declined over the period of this study irrespective of the underwriter and issue characteristics. Interaction terms ( YEAR X CASE1, YEAR X CASE2) are both significantly positive, indicating that the value of a standby letter of credit in both investment bank and commercial bank underwritten bonds has marginally declined over time.
BANK1 for the smaller issues is less than that for the large issues, both large and small firms benefit from the employment of the standby letter of credit along with the choice of an investment banker as the underwriter. The reductions in yield premiums of 7.71 and 5.32 basis points respectively for large and smaller firms, are both highly significant. By contrast, the coefficients for BANK2 show that, while large issuer yield spreads are negatively, but insignificantly, impacted by commercial banks supplying both letter of credit and underwriting services, the opposite is true for small firms whose yield spreads appear to be significantly affected in the positive direction when banks are underwriters. This increase of 6.15 basis points more than offsets the yield spread reduction caused by the use of the bank standby letter of credit. Regarding issue maturity, the BANK1 coefficient is only significant for the long maturities while BANK2 is only significant for short maturities.
(Insert Table 5 ) Table 6 presents regressions where the total sample is segmented according to whether the issue was underwritten by a commercial bank or a traditional investment bank while separating those issues backed and not backed by standby letters of credit. As can be seen, the need for a commercial bank to issue a standby letter of credit to back a commercial bank underwriting is viewed adversely rather than favorably by the market. While the coefficient is marginally significant, a higher spread is demanded by investors on such issues. This is consistent with the bank needing to credit-enhance weaker issues, with this enhancement appearing to signal a lower quality issue to investors. Indeed, the issues underwritten by a commercial bank without a standby letter of credit are received more favorably by the market (i.e., have lower spreads). Note that, in contrast, a commercial bank-supplied standby letter of credit to back an investment bank underwriting is viewed as a favorable signal of quality and spreads are lower with standby letter of credit backing than without by 6.13 basis points.
(Insert Table 6) Previous research (i.e., Carter and Manaster, 1990; Megginson and Weiss, 1991) has examined the role of the underwriting firm reputation in the pricing of security offerings. More recently, Livingston and Miller (2000) find that yields are lower for bonds underwritten by higher reputation underwriters, irrespective of whether they are investment banks or commercial banks. With respect to the industrial revenue bond market, the reputation of the investment banker appears to have an insignificant effect on spreads, given the presence of the standby letter of credit. The opposite is true in the commercial bank sample. The coefficient for the variable reputation for commercial banks is significantly negative, indicating that the better the reputation of the commercial bank the stronger the certification emanating from the standby letter of credit is likely to be. That is, the results for high reputation commercial banks (i.e., those banks with Section 20 subsidiaries in the sample period) more closely conform to those of investment banks.
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Thus far, we have not distinguished between the cases when the same commercial bank supplies both standby letter of credit and underwriting services as opposed to different commercial banks. However, using the subsample of eighty two issues that received standby letter of credit backing and underwriting services by commercial banks, it is possible to analyze independently the benefits and costs of joint certification by the same bank. Table 7 presents the results of a regression analysis similar to those in Tables 4-6. The LIST variable is excluded because none of the firms involved in these financings were exchange listed. A new variable, SAMEBANK, is equal to one when both services are provided by the same bank and zero otherwise. As noted earlier, thirty six of the eighty two issues employed the same bank to provide both services. The significantly negative coefficient for SAMEBANK in Table 7 suggests that employing a single bank to provide both services reduces the yield premium by 6.59 basis points. Thus, the evidence favors the presence of joint certification benefits. That is, any perceived conflicts of interest arising from the joint provision of these services are considered to be small compared to the strength of the positive certification signal that emanates from joint (double) certification by the same bank. This result is particularly relevant given that Table 3 shows that employing any combination of commercial banks, irrespective of their identity, for both functions was the most expensive option.
(Insert Table 7) Billett, Flannery and Garfinkel (1995) found that the identity of the lending institution, as evidenced by the credit rating on its subordinated debt, influenced the market response to a loan announcement. This raises the question as to whether the significance of the SAMEBANK variable is confirmation of a "double" certification effect or merely reflects the credit quality of the participating bank. To examine this issue, we identify the Moody's credit rating for each bank's unsecured debt at the time of the revenue bond issue. Each rating is converted to the same 20 point scale used in our RATING variable. We used two approaches to measure this potential credit quality effect. 12 First, we added BANKRATING as a new explanatory variable in tests of Equation 1 in Table 4 . The coefficient is significantly negative thus illustrating there is a legitimate reduction in the bond yield PREMIUM caused by the credit reputation of the bank.
More importantly for our study, this inclusion of BANKRATING does not alter the significance of the SAMEBANK variable. An alternative approach to measuring this credit effect is to include BANKRATING in the first stage equation for estimating the orthogonalized RATING variable on the premise that using higher quality banks as underwriters leads to a higher rating for the revenue bond. BANKRATING has a significantly positive effect on the issue rating.
Nevertheless, even when using this revised rating variable in Table 7 , SAMEBANK remained statistically significant.
A final robustness check of the SAMEBANK finding of a cost saving (in terms of yield spread) for issuers that use the same bank to both issue the standby letter of credit and to underwrite the debt is to examine the effects on yield premia of first time municipal debt offerings. Datta, Iskandar-Datta and Patel (1999) found that bank monitoring has a unique effect on the yield premia of first time public debt offerings by helping to lower the agency costs of public debt. In our study, those issues with no previous issuance by the municipal entity/lessee (PREVIOUS = 0) may exhibit a unique "IPO" type spread premium. We examined the PREMIUM/SAMEBANK model for the subsample in which PREVIOUS = 0 to test for this possible effect. Interestingly, the SAMEBANK coefficient remained negative and significant, further confirming the existence of a joint, or double, certifying effect when the same commercial bank is employed to both provide the standby letter of credit and underwrite the bond issue.
Summary and Conclusions
The preponderance of literature examining the role of the credit markets in the U.S.
financial system has focused on bank loan and corporate debt markets. However, as shown in Table 1 , the municipal debt market is close to rivaling each of these markets in terms of new issue volume. A major component of the municipal debt market consists of industrial revenue bond financing that uniquely combines the credit granting function of commercial banks with the underwriting function of both investment banks and commercial banks.
Specifically, this paper has employed data from the industrial revenue bond new issue market to examine the size and value, in terms of offering spreads, of using commercial banks as both underwriters and suppliers of contingent credit guarantees. In theory, both activities have certification value for the issuer. The value of these services is benchmarked against a sample of issues that have been underwritten by investment banks, both with and without standby letter of credit backing.
The results suggest that the use of commercial banks, as both underwriters and credit guarantors, might actually be harmful (result in higher spreads) to issuers except in the special case where the same bank offers both services jointly. This latter result is consistent with the gains from double certification dominating any potential conflicts of interest that may arise when the same bank jointly offers both services. Overall, however, those issues underwritten by investment banks (with or without credit guarantees) are most favorably received -suggesting the continuing importance (in terms of value) of traditional investment banker certification on issuer spreads and new issue costs. States, 1989 States, -1998 States, (in $ billions) 1989 States, 1990 States, 1991 States, 1992 States, 1993 States, 1994 States, 1995 States, 1996 States, 1997 States, 1998 [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] for which the interest rate on each bond was fixed and data was available. PREMIUM is the reoffering yield less the rate on a comparable maturity US government bond which has been adjusted for differences in state tax policy in terms of basis points. Both yields are adjusted for federal and state taxes. ISSUE SIZE and MATURITY are the size in millions of dollars and maturity in years, respectively; RATING is the Moody's bond rating for each issue based on the numerical scale etc.) 3 _______________________________________________________________________________________ *** Significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level. _____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ *** Significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level.
